BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN JUSTICE BREYER’S PROGRESSIVISM AND JUSTICE
SCALIA’S TEXTUALISM: INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF “NEGATIVE ORIGINALISM”
TO GUIDE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN “VALUES BASED” ADJUDICATION
By: Adam Lamparello1
“Liberty Can Find No Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt”2
INTRODUCTION
In Lawrence v. Texas3, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion4, which invalidated a
state statute prohibiting sodomy between consenting adults, and Justice Scalia’s dissent5,
which attacked the very foundation upon which the majority’s reasoning was predicated,
underscored the widely divergent methods of constitutional interpretation that both
Justices embrace in “values based” adjudication.6
Indeed, as set forth infra, in holding that the United State’s Constitution’s
“liberty” interest7 protected the right of two consenting adults to engage in sodomy,
Justice Breyer’s reasoning arguably reflected a “progressive”, “dynamic”, or “evolving”
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approach to constitutional interpretation, which views the Constitution as a “living”
document whose meaning is based, at least in part, upon an “emerging awareness8” of
contemporary customs, norms and perspectives.9 Indeed, Justice Breyer’s dynamic
approach to “values based” constitutional decision-making is perhaps best underscored
by the fact that, in striving to divine an “emerging awareness”10 to inform his view of the
Constitution’s “liberty” interest11, Justice Breyer resorted to, an relied upon, foreign
sources of law, i.e., decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights12, to
support the Lawrence majority’s holding.13
Conversely, Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent in Lawrence reflects his traditional
adherence to an “originalist”14 philosophy of constitutional decision-making which,
broadly construed, advances the proposition that fundamental constitutional rights exist

8

Lawrence, supra note 3, at 11 (majority opinion of Breyer, J).

9

Of course, the notion of an “evolving”, “progressive” or “dynamic” method of constitutional
interpretation is an approach endorsed and expressed in various forms by scholars, judges and litigants.
This Article is narrowly confined to examining Justice Breyer’s “progressive” approach in the Lawrence
decision, and to analyzing the implications of such methodology in “values based” cases that are likely to
arise before the United States Supreme Court.
10

Lawrence, supra note 3, at 11 (majority opinion of Breyer, J).

11

See supra note 7.

12

See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 12 (majority opinion of Breyer, J).

13

The utilization of foreign sources of law, to inform or otherwise support domestic constitutional
decisions, is reflected in the relative recent theory of “comparative constitutionalism”, which examines,
inter alia, the prudence of relying upon or referring to such sources in the domestic constitutional context
This Article is confined to both discussing Justice Breyer’s use of foreign law, particularly decisional law
from the European Court of Human Rights, in crafting the Lawrence opinion, and whether the use of
foreign law is workable and pragmatic in the context of domestic, “values based” decision-making. For a
more complete discussion of “comparative constitutionalism”, see, e.g., Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, “The
Permeability of Constitutional Borders”, 82 Texas L. Rev. 1763 (2004).

14

The “originalist” approach to constitutional interpretation exists in many forms and is applicable to many
contexts. The purpose of this Article is to examine Justice Scalia’s use of “originalism” in the Lawrence
decision, and to assess the workability of this approach in future cases likely to arise before the United
States Supreme Court.

2

only to the extent that such rights are “deeply rooted” in the United State’s culture,
history and tradition.15 Thus, in the context of “values based” adjudication, Justice
Scalia’s framework is to inquire whether and, if so, to what extent, the asserted
fundamental right has traditionally engendered support, protection or recognition in the
United State’s historical cultural practice.16 Such inquiry arguably involves an
examination of both the founders’ intent when drafting a particular constitutional
provision, as well as the early understandings of particular rights that were deemed
fundamental or worthy of heightened constitutional protection.

Under this view, in

“values based” adjudication, the notion of an “emerging” or “evolving” awareness of
fundamental rights, whether from foreign or domestic sources, would be largely
irrelevant to the question of whether an asserted right warrants constitutional protection.17
This Article endeavors to bridge the divide between Justice Breyer’s “progressive
approach”, and the “originalist” approach to which Justice Scalia adheres, by introducing
the concept of “reverse” or “negative” originalism. As a threshold matter, “reverse
originalism” recognizes that both Justice Breyer’s progressivism and Justice Scalia’s
originalism contain valuable aspects that should remain relevant to “values based”
constitutional adjudication. For example, “reverse originalism” proposes, in accordance
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with Justice Breyer’s approach, that “evolving” or contemporary perspectives of fairness
and due process should inform the search for a disposition, in “values based”
adjudication, that is most consonant with basic notions of liberty. Indeed, the collective
conscience of individuals, groups and institutions, over time, both domestic and
international, can provide important insights into the very meaning of “liberty” that lies at
the core of the United States’ constitutional framework.
Importantly, however, progressivism is not without its limitations and, if applied
exclusively, would threaten to undermine years of Supreme Court jurisprudence through
evisceration of the stare decisis doctrine18, risk uncertainty and unpredictability for future
litigants, unduly compromise the core majoritarian premise of our democratic system,
and potentially invest in judges a legislative or policy-making power that transgresses the
boundaries of proper judicial review. Consequently, a significant check upon the
limitations of “progressivism” lies in that aspect of “originalism” which reflects the
principle that the United States’ historical traditions, customs and practices should
maintain an important role in determining the values that we believe are worthy of
domestic constitutional protection. As such, the Constitution’s text, the very meaning of
“liberty” that emanates from its provisions, and our country’s deeply-rooted cultural
understandings regarding the concept of “liberty”, must continue to inform current
perspectives concerning those “values” that the United States will deem fundamental.
As with “progressivism”, however, the application of “originalism” is not without
its limitations. Most significantly, the exclusive application of “originalism” is likely to
18
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result in constitutional decisions that contemporary perspectives would arguably deem
unfair and unjust.19 Indeed, such criticism is not without merit because, while
conceptions of “liberty” involve reference to deeply-rooted historical practice and
custom, such conceptions do not remain inert or immutable, but are instead receptive to
the evolution in human thought that Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” embraces. Herein
lies the problem, namely, what method can best recognize the “emerging awareness” that
Justice Breyer relies upon in Lawrence, yet remain faithful to the text, history and
historical traditions that “originalism” strives to maintain.
This Article proposes that “negative originalism” can bridge this divide and
effectuate the objectives of Justice Breyer’s progressivism, i.e., just results based upon
evolving standards of fairness, and Justice Scalia’s “originalism”, by re-framing the
relevant constitutional inquiry in “values based” adjudication. Specifically, instead of
asking precisely what the framers intended when drafting a particular constitutional
provision, the relevant inquiry should assess whether the recognition of a new
fundamental right in our constitutional regime would offend, affront, or otherwise be
incongruous with the broad purposes underlying both the Constitution’s provisions and
the United State’s rich historical tradition. As detailed infra, this approach will allow the
Supreme Court to consider contemporary perspectives regarding fundamental fairness,
liberty and equality, both at the national and international level, when deciding whether
newly asserted rights or “values” warrant constitutional protection.
However, “negative originalism” will also require the Court to lend significant
weight to the intentions, purposes and objectives that informed both the Constitution’s
19
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drafting and the nation’s early understandings of liberty. However, instead of advocating
that the Court endeavor to divine the precise meaning that the Constitution’s drafters, or
early legislatures, specifically intended for a given constitutional provision, “negative
originalism” proposes that the Court develop an understanding of the broader conception
of liberty, fairness and equality that inspired the Constitution’s substantive provisions. In
this way, “negative originalism” ensures that our country’s rich history and tradition
remains relevant in “values based” cases, but also recognizes that contemporary
perspectives concerning fairness and equality, both domestic and foreign, can be useful
in fashioning solutions to problems that the Constitution’s drafters could never have
envisaged.
Part II briefly discusses the Lawrence decision, specifically with reference to the
differing approaches that Justices Breyer and Scalia utilized in reaching their respective
conclusions. Part III examines a critical component of Justice Breyer’s progressivism,
namely, that aspect which relied upon foreign law, namely the European Court of Human
Rights, to support the Lawrence holding. Part III concludes that, while resort to foreign
sources of law should bear relevance in “values based” adjudication, courts should
exercise substantial caution when relying upon foreign sources of law, due to the cultural
and institutional nuances that underlie such laws.

Part IV introduces “negative

originalism”, and argues that this method of constitutional interpretation will most
effectively permit the Court to adopt a dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation,
i.e., consideration of evolving perspectives of fairness, while also ensuring fidelity to the
Constitution’s text and history.
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PART II
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: HIGHLIGHTING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN JUSTICE BREYER’S
“PROGRESSIVISM” AND JUSTICE SCALIA’S “ORIGINALISM”
In Lawrence, the Court was confronted with the question of whether a state
statute, criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults, impermissibly violated the
privacy, equal protection, and “liberty” interests under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.20 Significantly, this issue was
not without precedent, as the Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick21 previously ruled that a
Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults did not violate these
fundamental guarantees.22
Thus, Lawrence presented the Court with an opportunity both to revisit the
Bowers holding and examine the reasoning upon which it was predicated. In so doing, the
Court, per Justice Kennedy, overruled Bowers, and proceeded to recognize consensual
sodomy as a protected right pursuant to the Constitution’s “liberty” interest.23 As stated
above, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion not only signaled a sharp departure from
Bowers, particularly through its expansive view of the Constitution’s “liberty” interest,
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but also underscored the “progressivism” that increasingly defines his jurisprudence in
“values based” adjudication.
A.

JUSTICE KENNEDY’S PROGRESSIVISM IN LAWRENCE

At the outset, it is important to recognize that Justice Breyer’s majority decision
was not premised solely upon a “progressive” or “evolving” view of the Constitution’s
“liberty” interest. For example, Justice Breyer disagreed with Justice Scalia’s view that
homosexual sodomy has, as a matter of historical tradition and practice, been widely
circumscribed.24 In addition, Justice Breyer relied upon what he termed “broad
statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause” as reflected
in the Court’s earlier jurisprudence.25
Notwithstanding, Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” played a crucial role both in
his conclusion that Bowers’ foundation had been eroded by subsequent jurisprudence,
and that homosexual sodomy now fell within the purview of the Constitution’s “liberty”
interest. 26 First, Justice Breyer’s analysis focused not only upon the historical roots and
practices pertaining to consensual sodomy (although he did dispute the extent to which
24
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laws were targeted at such conduct27), but instead stated that “we think that our laws and
traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.”28 Indeed, Justice Breyer
utilized this framework in Lawrence to highlight a “progressive” or “evolving” method of
constitutional interpretation:
These references [recent precedent] show an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex. “[H]istory and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry.” This emerging recognition should have been apparent when
Bowers was decided.29
Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s search for an “emerging awareness” led him to focus not
upon historical culture, practice or tradition, but instead upon more recent domestic
developments, i.e., the Model Penal Code’s recommendation that private sexual conduct
not be penalized, and several states’ failure to enforce anti-sodomy laws, for the
proposition that homosexual conduct was includable within the Constitution’s liberty
interest.30
Of far more import, however, was the fact that, as part of his “emerging
awareness” analysis, Justice Breyer relied upon foreign sources of law to support the
Lawrence holding. For example, Justice Breyer relied upon the British Parliament’s 1957
recommendation that homosexual conduct not be punished.31 More importantly, however,
and in what is a focal point of this Article, Justice Breyer relied substantially upon
27
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decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, which supported his expansive
view of the Constitution’s “liberty” interest:
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the
European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels to Bowers
and to today’s case. An adult male resident in Northern Ireland alleged he was
a practicing homosexual who desired to engage in consensual homosexual
conduct. The laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right … The court
held that the laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1981) Par. 52. Authoritative in all countries that are members of the Council
of Europe … the decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim
put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.32
Thus, in addition to relying upon domestic development both prior and subsequent to
Bowers33, Justice Kennedy ushered in a new jurisprudence utilized foreign sources of law
to inform his “progressive” jurisprudence and, ultimately, domestic constitutional
decision-making:
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected
elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has not followed Bowers but
its own decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom. See P.G. & J.H. v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, Par. 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 25, 2001) …
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct … The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no
showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.34
Ultimately, therefore, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence underscores his
commitment to a “progressive” approach to constitutional interpretation in “values
based” adjudication, and to using foreign sources of law as a method by which to divine
32

Id. at 12 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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Id. at 13-14 (Breyer, J., majority opinion) (discussing Bowers subsequent erosion by in Casey and Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
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the “emerging awareness”35 that characterizes such jurisprudence.

In other words, the

use of foreign sources of law is an important aspect of Justice Breyer’s progressive
jurisprudence, and will be analyzed infra Part III.
B.

JUSTICE SCALIA’S “ORIGINALISM” IN LAWRENCE

In stark contrast to Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” was Justice Scalia’s dissent,
which re-affirmed his commitment to an “originalist” method of constitutional
interpretation in “values based” adjudication.36 In fact, arguably reflecting his
commitment to interpreting the Constitution solely in accordance with historical
perspectives, Justice Scalia went so far as to declare in Lawrence that “there is no right to
‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause, though today’s opinion repeatedly makes that
claim.”37 Indeed, Justice Scalia believes that the Due Process Clause grants procedural
rather than substantive protection, leading to his statement in Lawrence that “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows States to deprive their citizens of “liberty”, so
long as “due process of law” is provided ...”38
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia’s threshold assumption that the Due Process
Clause protects procedural, rather than substantive rights, reflects an “originalist”
perspective that could not be more at odds with Justice Breyer’s “progressivism”. In any
event, to the extent that Justice Scalia recognizes the existence of “substantive” rights
35
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scholars, commentators and judges. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address the myriad components
of “originalism”, and the various contexts to which it is applied. Rather, this paper strives to analyze Justice
Scalia’s use of originalism in Lawrence, and as a method of constitutional adjudication in “values based”
adjudication.
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within the Due Process Clause, he is to careful to note that “w[e] have held repeatedly …
that only fundamental rights qualify for this so-called “heightened scrutiny” protection—
that is, rights which are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”39 Thus, for
Justice Scalia, a right qualifies as fundamental under the Due Process Clause only if it is
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people … [and that it be] an interest
traditionally protected by our society.”40 Accordingly, apart from “those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”,41
“[a]ll other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted
state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”42 Applying this
framework, Justice Scalia relied upon the traditions, customs and practices of the fifty
states to arrive at the “definitive [historical] conclusion”43 that “our Nation has a long
history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general—regardless of whether it was performed
by same sex or opposite sex couples.”44 On this basis alone, Justice Scalia would have
found that a contemporary law prohibiting consensual sodomy was well within a State’s
constitutional prerogative.

39

Id. at 8 (Scalia, J., dissenting). (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721) Justice Scalia also
noted that a “fundamental liberty interest” must also be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” so that
“neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed”) (quoting Washington, 521 U.S. at 721).
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More fundamentally, Justice Scalia’s “originalism” entirely rejects the “emerging
awareness” analysis that characterizes Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” and, in particular,
the use of foreign sources of law to divine evolving notions of liberty. As he noted in
Lawrence, “an ‘emerging awareness’ is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition[s]’45, as we have said “fundamental right” status requires.”46 In
Justice Scalia’s view, therefore, “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence
because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain
behavior.”47 Perhaps most importantly, according to Justice Scalia, the use of foreign
sources of law is a particularly troubling and should have no place whatsoever in the
Court’s domestic, “values based” constitutional analysis:
Much less do they [fundamental rights] spring into existence … because
foreign nations decriminalize conduct. The Bowers majority opinion never
relied on “values we share with a wider civilization” … but rather rejected the
claimed right to sodomy on the ground that such a right was not “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” … Bowers … holding is likewise
devoid of any reliance on the views of a “wider civilization” … the Court’s
discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that
have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy .. is therefore meaningless
dicta.48
Such reliance, moreover, is particularly “dangerous” because “this Court … should not
impose foreign moods, fads or fashions on Americans.”49 This statement reflects a core
criticism that Justice Scalia espouses regarding “progressivism”, namely, that “traditional

45

Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

46

Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

47

Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-194) (emphasis in original).

49

Id. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n. (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari).
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democratic action should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new
‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of democratic change.”50
Ultimately, the approaches advocated by Justices Breyer and Scalia raise the
fundamental question of whether “progressivism” or “originalism” represents the best
method by which to adjudicate “values based” disputes. The answer to this question first
requires a brief analysis of each theory’s benefits and limitations, after which the concept
of “reverse originalism” is introduced.
PART III
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN “VALUES BASED” ADJUDICATION: JUSTICE
BREYER’S “PROGRESSIVISM” OR JUSTICE SCALIA’S “ORIGINALISM”?
The Lawrence decision underscores the significant divide between Justice
Breyer’s and Justice Scalia’s constitutional methodology in “values-based” adjudication.
Indeed, Lawrence raises the critical question of whether “progressivism” or “originalism”
represents the more effective method by which to decide the fundamental constitutional
questions that “values” based adjudication presents. As a threshold matter, this Article
presupposes that the preferable approach is one that leads to results that are consonant
with contemporary notions of fairness and equality, yet also remains faithful to the
traditions and practices upon which our constitutional jurisprudence is predicated.
Importantly, a brief examination of both approaches, including their benefits and
limitations, reveals that a combination of these interpretive methods would most
effectively yield a “values based” jurisprudence that responds to contemporary
perspectives while respecting our Nation’s historical underpinnings. Such a combination,
termed “reverse” or “negative” originalism, is introduced infra Part IV.
50

Id. at 19-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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A.

JUSTICE BREYER’S “PROGRESSIVISM” – RELIANCE ON FOREIGN
SOURCES OF LAW TO DIVINE AN “EMERGING AWARENESS”

Importantly, perhaps the most critical component of Justice Breyer’s
“progressive” analysis in Lawrence was his reliance upon foreign sources of law,
particularly decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, to inform his
determination that there existed an “emerging awareness” in favor of protecting private
consensual homosexual conduct. Indeed, the very concept of an “emerging awareness”
arguably implies, although does not ensure, that a court will look beyond a country’s
geographic borders to determine, as Justice Breyer noted, whether the “wider
civilization”51 evinces a predilection or tendency to protect a newly asserted right.
In any event, Justice Breyer’s use of “progressivism” expressly endorses, refers to
and relies upon foreign sources of law to inform “values based” constitutional analysis.
The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether reliance upon foreign sources of law is a viable
method by which to adjudicate domestic, “values based” constitutional adjudication. An
examination of this question reveals that Justice Breyer’s reliance upon foreign sources of
law, specifically decisional law from the European Court of Human Rights, raises several
concerns that caution against relying too heavily upon the laws and decisions of foreign
jurisdictions to resolve domestic constitutional disputes.
1.

JUSTICE BREYER’S RELIANCE UPON JURISPRUDENCE FROM
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS – HIGHLIGHTING
THE PROBLEMS OF USING FOREIGN SOURCES OF LAW IN
DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES.

As set forth above, in Lawrence Justice Breyer relied upon decisional law from
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), that prohibited the criminalization of

51

Lawrence, supra note 3, at 16 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
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consensual homosexual sodomy. Specifically, in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom52, a case
cited by Justice Breyer in his majority opinion, the ECHR held that consensual
homosexual conduct was a protected “privacy” right pursuant to Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.53 Significantly, therefore, Justice Breyer’s
reliance upon the ECHR (and other sources of foreign law) was an important aspect of
his “progressivism”, namely, his belief that an “emerging awareness” existed in favor of
prohibiting the criminalization of consensual homosexual conduct. Critically, however,
such reliance raises legitimate concerns that courts must address when using foreign
sources of law to support domestic constitutional decisions.
Indeed, as set forth below, Justice Breyer’s reliance upon ECHR precedent raises
implicates several problematic issues that caution against relying too heavily upon
foreign sources of law to support constitutional decisions in the domestic context.

a. As a Human Rights Court, the ECHR Performs A Different
Institutional Role In Interpreting An International Treaty
To begin with, as an institutional matter the ECHR is responsible for interpreting
and applying the European Convention on Human Rights, which is viewed as an
international treaty and not a domestic constitutional text.54 This distinction is not without
a difference, because the ECHR’s institutional role arguably implicates different
52

45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981), Par. 52, as cited in Lawrence, supra note 3, at 12 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).
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Id.
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See Paul De Hert, “Balancing security and liberty within the European human rights framework. A
critical reading of the Court’s case law in light of surveillance and criminal law enforcement strategies
after 9/11” http://www.ultrechtlawreview.org/ Volume, 1, Issue 1 at 71 (2005) (stating that “the
Convention is not a Constitution but a Treaty. After ratification it does not automatically form part of the
domestic legal orders of a Member State … Although the Court has referred to the Convention as “a
constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public)”, it has accepted the treaty-like status of
the Convention”) (citation omitted).
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considerations, both as a matter philosophy and interpretation, when adjudicating human
rights (as opposed to domestic constitutional) disputes. As an initial matter, the ECHR is
an international, rather than domestic court, and its overriding purpose is to effectuate,
and arguably expand, the broad human rights guarantees of an international treaty. The
ECHR’s institutional role, therefore, is both more specific and far broader than that of a
domestic constitutional court because its primary role is to interpret and provide
substantive meaning to a document (the Convention) whose provisions are unified by an
overriding human rights objective. Indeed, the specific objective of the ECHR’s mission
necessarily entails the use of interpretive methods that differ vastly from a domestic
constitutional court, which often construes provisions within a constitution that are
separate from, unrelated to and not connected by a single overriding purpose. As a result,
unlike a domestic constitutional court, the ECHR’s specifically defined institutional role
creates a paramount value upon which its jurisprudence is developed.
The narrower nature of the ECHR’s institutional purpose, however, is enhanced
by the fact that, as an international court interpreting an international treaty, it is not
bound by the traditional temporal and/or geographic limitations to which domestic
constitutional courts often believe themselves to be bound.

For example, as expressed

by Justice Scalia in Lawrence, a domestic constitutional court, when interpreting a
national constitution, may limit itself to analyzing the history, customs, traditions and/or
practices of its country, while eschewing the consideration of sources from beyond its
borders.55 This significance of this concept is that a domestic constitutional court’s
jurisprudence often imposes constraints upon itself that results in jurisprudence uniquely
personal to its territorial jurisdiction. In this way, the perspectives of a domestic
55

See Lawrence, supra note 3, at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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constitutional court are likely, although not certain, to differ substantially from those of
an international human rights court, because the sources of decision-making are
different. Stated simply, the legal dynamics between the ECHR and domestic
constitutional courts are quite distinct, as the ECHR has at its disposal a significantly
broader array of law, tradition and custom upon which to inform its human rights-based
jurisprudence. This fact that is perhaps best underscored in the differing interpretive
methodology that the ECHR employs in “values based” adjudication.
b.

The ECHR’s Status as an International Human Rights Court,
Which Interprets an International Human Rights Treaty,
Engenders a Distinct Interpretive Methodology than Those
Employed by Many Domestic Constitutional Courts.

The concerns raised by incorporation of ECHR precedent in American
constitutional law are underscored by the fact that both courts arguably employ different
interpretive methodologies. First, because the Convention enjoys the status of an
international treaty, the ECHR interprets its provisions, inter alia, in accordance with
international law principles.56 Indeed, in Golder v. United Kingdom57, the Court stated
that interpretation of the Convention’s provisions would be guided by the interpretive
methods established at the 1989 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.58 The
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See Christian Bonat, The European Court of Human Rights, published by The Federalist Society for Law
and Public Policy Studies, at 19 [hardcopy available upon request].
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1 E.H.H.R. 524 (1979-80), as cited in Bonat, supra note 56, at 19.
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See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, European Journal of International Law (2003) at
533-538 (discussing relevant methods of treaty interpretation, including: (1) the plain meaning as
understood in light of the object and purpose of a treaty; (2) subsequent practice; (3) relevant rules of
international law; and (4) preparatory work.
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international focus of the Court’s jurisprudence, therefore, only re-enforces the differing
approach to constitutional interpretation that the ECHR and U.S. Supreme Court apply.59
Of more consequence, however, is the “dynamic” or “evolving” method of
interpretation that the ECHR has increasingly employed in its jurisprudence. Ostensibly
arising from Article 31(1) the Vienna Convention, stating that the terms of a treaty should
be interpreted in light of its object and purpose60, the ECHR has adopted a “dynamic”
approach that views the Convention as “a living instrument which … must be interpreted
in light of present-day conditions.”61 Indeed, the ECHR’s dynamic approach manifests
itself through the “effectiveness principle”, in which the Court stresses that the
Convention “is intended to guarantee ‘not rights that are theoretical or illusory but
practical and effective’”62:
Regarding the former, the Court will interpret the Convention’s provisions in
order to make them ‘practical and effective’ in servicing the broad objective it
has adopted. Thus, if the treaty by its plain language is not ‘effectively’
protecting a particular right, the Court will see fit to make it so through
expansive interpretation.63
In essence “the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection
of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to
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This proposition is not without qualification, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court, in certain contexts,
i.e., Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, looks beyond its borders to “evolving standards of decency” both
domestically and abroad.

60

See, e.g., Orakhelashvili, supra note 58.

61
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make its safeguards practical and effective … any interpretation must be consistent with
… the ideals and values of a democratic society.”64
The Court’s “living document” philosophy is also reflected in the “consensus
doctrine,” a method by which the Court “finds an internal European consensus, assumes
this increase in rights was done in fealty to the Convention, and then imposes this new
standard on the straggling state.”65 For example, in Goodwin v. United Kingdom,66 the
Court “looked outside of Europe and found an international ‘common ground’ granting
full legal recognition of gender reassigned transsexuals…”67 In accordance with its
“evolving” method of interpretation, the Court stated that “while there had not been a
statistical increase in States giving full legal recognition of gender re-assignment within
Europe, information from outside Europe showed developments in that direction.”68
Thus, Goodwin not only underscores the Court’s expansive view of the Convention’s
provisions, but “by reaching beyond Europe explicitly connects the Court’s interpretation
with evolving international human rights standards.”69

Lastly, in certain areas, the

Court’s expansive jurisprudence has resulted in the imposition of “positive obligations”
upon member states, that is, a requirement that a particular member state undertake
measures to ensure the effectuation of a particular right.70
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Id. at 22 (quoting Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), Par. 102)).
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See Bonat, supra note 56, at 23.
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35 E.H.R.R. 18 (2002), Par. 85.
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68
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Importantly, the ECHR’s dynamic, “living document” philosophy has resulted in
very expansive decisions that most American courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme
Court, would be unlikely to countenance. This proposition is evident in the ECHR’s
“privacy” jurisprudence, particularly in the area of “relational” privacy, which arises
under Article 8 of the convention.71 For example, in A.D.T. v. United Kingdom72, the
Court held that the United Kingdom’s “Sexual Offenses Act of 1967” violated Article 8
because, although it decriminalized homosexual conduct, it expressly prohibited such
conduct where more than two individuals were present.73 Likewise, in Goodwin, supra,74
the Court accorded full legal recognition to transsexuals, and thereafter, in Van Kuck v.
Germany,75 expanded the rights of transsexuals, finding that German courts violated
Article 8 when they failed to define gender reassignment surgery as “necessary medical
treatment”76 and thus eligible for reimbursement by a private insurance company.77
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Article 8 of the Convention provides that “ (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of rights and
freedoms of others.” There exists a doctrinally rich body of law concerning the ECHR’s interpretation of
Article 8, particularly with respect to those acts by member states that are “in accordance with law”;
“necessary in a democratic society”; and “in the interests of … health or morals”. Such discussion is
beyond the scope of this paper, except to highlight the expansive interpretive method that the ECHR
employs.
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Likewise, in the area of “zonal” or “territorial” privacy, the Court, in Von Hannover v.
Germany78, held that Princess Carolina’s right to privacy under Article 8 was violated
when she was photographed by media officials while engaging in leisurely activities
outside of her residence.79 Additionally, in Peck v. United Kingdom,80 the Court held that
a British citizen, who was located by police attempting to commit suicide in a public
place, and otherwise exhibiting erratic behavior, suffered a violation of his privacy where
a videotape of the event was televised by national and local media outlets.81
Significantly, the evolving nature of the Court’s Article 8 jurisprudence is further
underscored by dicta in these (and other) decisions that delineate the expanding nature of
privacy rights in Europe. For example, in Goodwin the Court stated that “serious
interference with private life can arise where the state of domestic law conflicts with an
important aspect of personal identity … [because] the stress and alienation arising from
the discordance between the [person’s] position in society … cannot … be regarded as a
minor inconvenience …”82 Likewise, in Van Kuck, the Court indicated that the concept of
“private life” is very broad and “covers the physical and psychological integrity of the
person,” which encompasses “an individual’s physical and social identity … personal
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human
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App. No. 59320/00 (June 2004).
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Id. at Pars. 76-80.
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App. No. 44647/98 (January 28, 2003).
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Id. at Pars. 86 and 87.
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Goodwin, supra note 66, at Par. 77. (emphasis added) (the Court also held that “the very essence of the
Convention being respect for human dignity and freedom, protection is given to the right of transsexuals to
personal development and to physical and moral security”) Id. at Par. 70.
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beings and the outside world.”83 Additionally, in Von Hannover, the Court stated that
notions of private life are designed to “ensure the development, without outside
interference, of the personality of each individual in his relations with other human
beings [in the public domain].”84 The right to privacy, moreover, “includes a social
dimension”,85 that extends “into the “public context”86 and “may include activities of a
professional or business nature.”87
The Court’s privacy jurisprudence is significant because it highlights both the
courts differing institutional role, and jurisprudential focus, from that of the U.S.
Supreme Court. First, its decisional law under Article 8 demonstrates that the ECHR is
arguably committed to expanding the concept of privacy to the outer limits of what can
be deemed an “international consensus.” In other words, its view of Article 8 is primarily
forward-looking and progressive, as its precedent shows few, if any, strict limitations
upon an individual’s right to private life. Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
approach, which is arguably informed by its responsibility to interpret a constitutional
text, reflects the fact that the Constitution both grants and restricts the fundamental
guarantees that it embodies. In this way, these respective Courts serve different
institutional roles by virtue of the fact that they are interpreting very different documents,
which not only have different purposes and objectives, but derive from a different
historical dynamic. This notion, therefore, is at least partially responsible for the differing
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degrees of protection that privacy engenders in the European Union as opposed to the
United States. Consequently, to the extent that judges, i.e., Justice Breyer, rely upon
foreign law to support a domestic constitutional decision, such reliance must consider not
merely the judgments themselves, but also the institutions and doctrinal bases from which
they emanate.
c.

The ECHR is not as Committed to the Democratic Premise of
Majoritarianism

Another substantial difference is that the ECHR, particularly in the area of
“morals” legislation, is not nearly as deferential to Member States, and this is reflected in
its tendency to de-emphasize the “margin of appreciation”88 doctrine and, in some cases,
impose positive obligations upon states to ensure realization of a particular right. As a
threshold matter, the “margin of appreciation” is designed, in theory, to accord some
measure of deference to Member States’ legislative enactment.89 As a practical matter,
particularly in morals or public welfare legislation, the Court has been reticent to apply
this doctrine with any degree of consistency. For example, in Norris v. Ireland90, the
Court stated that “not only the nature of the aim of the restriction but also the nature of
the activities involved will affect the scope of the margin of appreciation.”91 Thus, in
cases implicating “a most intimate aspect of private life … there must exist particularly
serious reasons before interferences on the part of public authorities can be legitimate.”92
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See, e.g., Bonat, supra note 56, at 25 (stating that, as the Convention evolves, less and less deference is
accorded to the parties.”) (emphasis in original).
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In fact, in Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. United Kingdom93, the Court held that “serious
reasons” exist only where the legislation at issue “answers a pressing social need”94 and
is “proportionate”95 to the asserted objective. However, as Bonat states, “[t]here is no
hard and fast rule on scope of the margin of appreciation … [i]t is a self-regulating
doctrine for the Court, and as the Convention evolves, less and less deference is accorded
to the parties.”96 Thus, the uneven (and uncertain) degree to which the Court will apply
the “margin of appreciation”, coupled with the application of “positive obligations” in
some cases, substantially eviscerates any meaningful deference to Member States where
fundamental rights are implicated.
Indeed, pursuant to the related (although distinct), doctrine of “positive
obligations”, the Court has held that Article 8 “does not merely compel the State to
abstain from such [arbitrary] interference [with privacy] … there may be positive
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life … [which] may
involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.”97 To be fair, however,
pursuant to the doctrine of “subsidiarity”, the Member States “are primarily responsible
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for guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of the Convention, so it falls to the State in
question how it is to comply with the Court’s decision.”98
Not insignificantly, the Court’s activist approach differs substantially from the
deference that American courts generally afford to state legislative enactments,
particularly in the context of morals. Again, this is due both to the American
constitutional structure as well as the legal framework adopted by particular courts. For
example, the Constitution creates a system of enumerated powers that vests with
individual states the primary legislative authority in areas such as health, welfare and
public safety.99 Of course, while there is an ongoing debate regarding the degree of
deference to be accorded in particular cases100, the fact remains that, in a significant
majority of cases involving “values” or “morality”, courts are ordinarily circumspect not
to substitute their subjective policy predilections for those of a particular state legislature.
Conversely, while recognizing this principle in theory, the ECHR’s application of the
“margin of appreciation”, coupled with its imposition of positive obligations upon
member states, suggest that it is, at least in certain areas, far more willing to invalidate
legislation that arguably furthers legitimate objectives, and upon which reasonable minds
could conceivably disagree. To be sure, the ECHR’s activist role represents a logical
outgrowth of its dynamic interpretive method, which consistently strives to broaden the
Convention’s human rights guarantees despite, in some cases, the absence of a European
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regarding the scope of such deference is beyond the scope of this Article.
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consensus.101 However, the Court’s evolving judicial philosophy is incompatible with the
recognition by most American jurists that legislative promulgations, as a core product of
democratic processes, federalism and majority rule, should not be readily invalidated
based upon a mere desire to expand or otherwise arrive at more desirable policy
outcomes.102 As one commentator has noted, “[e]uropean constitutional tradition
contemplates ‘a constitutional order embodying universal principles that derive their
authority from sources outside national democratic processes and that constrain national
self-government.”103
Ultimately, therefore, because there is a considerable difference in the deference
pursuant to which the American courts and ECHR will review “values” based legislation,
there will undoubtedly be instances where the ECHR would likely reach a different
results in cases involving similar facts.104

Aside from the fact that this important

distinction results largely from each courts’ respective institutional role, and the
documents from which they derive their respective authority, it counsels against relying
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too heavily upon foreign sources of law, at least without due regard to the unique
institutional nuances that facilitate particular decision-making processes.
d.

Foreign Sources of Law Are the Product of Unique Cultural,
Social, Economic and Political Dynamics

Finally, as alluded to above, foreign court decisions do not exist in isolation, but
are instead responsive to the unique historical, cultural and constitutional traditions that
influence a court’s perspective. For example, as Kenneth Anderson explains, unlike the
United States, Western European constitutionalism does not place emphasis upon the
primacy of democratic self-governance and national majoritarian prerogatives:
[F]ollowing the nationalist disasters of the interwar and Second World War
period, much of Western Europe’s constitutionalism was explicitly about
reaching to any available source of constitutionalism other than national
democratic self-government, which, equated with populism, was seen in no
small part as a root evil of war and social strife. It is a tradition deeply fearful
of democracy and above all hostile to the concept of popular sovereignty.
Indeed, in international constitutionalism, ‘interpretation by a body of
international jurists is, in principle, not only satisfactory but superior to local
interpretation, which invariably involves constitutional law in partisan and
ideological political disputes’.105
Importantly, this approach differs dramatically from the American perspective, which
“regards constitutional law as the embodiment of a particular nation’s democratically
self-given legal and political commitments … [American] constitutional law is
emphatically not antidemocratic … [but] aims at democracy over time.”106 In this way,
“those who interpret its constitutional text owe their allegiance to … [a] democratic, selfgoverning community.”107
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The difficulty, therefore, in relying upon foreign sources of law, as Justice Breyer
did in Lawrence, is that it may not be sufficiently mindful of the vastly different
historical, cultural and constitutional perspectives that inform a particular decision. This
problem is no more evident than when comparing Western European and American
constitutionalism, particularly the ECHR’s jurisprudence, because, in stark contrast to its
dynamic framework, in the United States “[c]onstitutional interpretation is not merely a
matter of ‘best policy’, considered in a vacuum, but ‘best policy’ as it has arisen through
democratic processes—which may or may not have been successful in reaching the best
policy.”108 In other words, American constitutionalism represents “a vision of democratic
constitutional self-government founded upon democracy and popular sovereignty –
everything that international constitutionalism and the European tradition most
rejects.”109
Thus, the problems that “comparative constitutionalism” engender militate against
relying too heavily upon foreign court decisions in the domestic constitutional context.
Indeed, the presence of widely divergent historical, cultural and constitutional traditions
requires, at the very least, that judges comprehend the context within which a foreign
decision was rendered, a task that may itself be impractical. Moreover, the sheer volume
of foreign materials upon which a court may elect to rely can, conceivably, create the
appearance of self-serving expedience or, far worse, render such reliance susceptible to
claims of arbitrariness

In addition, venturing outside of the domestic constitutional

context risks engendering the claim that a particular judge (or court) is acting in an elitist
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manner that is intended to further a subjective policy predilection not supported by
domestic law and tradition. Such a claim would be particularly troubling in the American
constitutional structure, because its tradition explicitly emphasizes national democratic
self-government and respect for majority will. Thus, “ comparative constitutionalism”
raises substantial concerns that cannot be vitiated by claims that such reliance is merely
for “informative” purposes.110
Of course, this does not mean that foreign sources should not serve to support
domestic decision in some instances, but the manner and method by which such use is
sanctioned is not certain. This Article does not claim that foreign sources of law should
never be used, but rather that its use in “values” based adjudication should be done, if at
all, cautiously and with particular sensitivity attention to the historical traditions of the
domestic nation. Critically, though, this claim substantially undermines Justice Breyer’s
“progressivism”, because a substantial component of that approach is to rely upon foreign
sources of law to discern a rights-based consensus. However, the answer to this problem
does not necessarily entail elimination of Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” as a viable
methodology in “values” based cases, nor, as discussed below, does it support the
proposition that Justice Scalia’s “originalism” should guide the Court’s interpretive
framework.
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B.

JUSTICE SCALIA’S “ORIGINALISM” -- PROBLEMS WITH EXCLUSIVE
RELIANCE UPON THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION

As stated supra, in Lawrence Justice Scalia eschewed the majority’s reliance upon
foreign jurisprudence, dismissing such reliance as “meaningless dicta” that sought to
“impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”111 For Justice Scalia, the only
values, or rights, that are worthy of constitutional protection are those that are “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”112 To be sure, the asserted right must “be an
interest traditionally protected by our society”113 and “so rooted … in the conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”114 Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted in
Lawrence that, even if a right is designated as fundamental, it is not immune from
restriction should an individual state proffer a compelling interest justifying its
infringement.115 Moreover, all other asserted “liberty” interests, “may be abridged or
abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”116 Applying his “originalist” philosophy, Justice Scalia
surveyed the historical landscape, particularly state legislative enactments and, far from
discerning an interest “traditionally protected by our society”117, found that “our Nation
has a longstanding history of laws prohibiting sodomy in general…”118 Accordingly,
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Justice Scalia would have upheld the State of Texas’ prohibition upon consensual
sodomy, even though it was directed at same-sex couples, because the historical tradition
of prohibiting such conduct existed “regardless of whether it was performed by same-sex
or opposite-sex couples.”119 Importantly, it is not surprising that, for Justice Scalia, the
use of foreign law in this context was not only “meaningless dicta”120, but contrary the
requirement that fundamental rights be rooted in domestic tradition and practice. Thus,
Justice Scalia’s “originalist” philosophy in “values” based constitutional adjudication
provides no basis whatsoever for relying upon foreign sources of law.121
However, Justice Scalia’s “originalism” in this context is not without its
conceptual and practical difficulties. First, despite the ease with which Justice Scalia
apparently discerns domestic constitutional tradition relating to a particular issue, such
endeavor can prove elusive and, in some case, lead to inconsistent, uncertain or contrary
views on precisely what this Nation’s historical practice communicates. The domestic
historical record, whether it be law, custom, or practice, is not likely to provide a
straightforward answer to questions regarding the specific rights that should be deemed
fundamental. In fact, the record may be susceptible to varying degrees of interpretation
that depends more upon how the inquiry is framed, rather than upon the existence of a
traditional consensus. In other words, reliance upon history and tradition is capable of the
same arbitrary and self-serving reliance that the use of foreign law potentially risks.
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In Lawrence, for example, Justice Breyer disputed Justice Scalia’s view that there
existed a “long-standing history in this country of laws” proscribing homosexual
conduct.122 Of course, Justice Scalia responded by asserting that traditional practice
prohibited sodomy in general, underscoring that the method by which a court frames the
relevant inquiry can have a direct impact upon such court’s interpretation of historical
practice. In any event, the sheer volume of the historical traditions or practices to which
Justice Scalia speaks are not likely to provide straightforward guidance in specific cases.
Second, and more fundamentally, “originalism” can result in unjust decisions that,
based upon contemporary perspectives, are inconsistent with modern notions of liberty
and equality.123 Stated simply, it can lead to harsh, even absurd, results. For example, in
an article discussing Cass Sunstein’s “Radicals in Robes: Why Right-Wing Courts are
Wrong For America”, Stephen Pomper discusses the implications of the “originalist”
approach:
Sunstein’s main objections to originalism don’t have to do with its theoretical
vulnerabilities … [h]is principle objections are about the results that it would
produce … If applied in its most literal sense, the theory would force the
courts to peel away decades of constitutional law, and return the Constitution
to the state it was in prior to the New Deal … A rigid application of
originalism would, for example, gut the case law on reproductive freedom …
[and] on relatively uncontroversial issues like the right of married persons to
buy birth control … [a]nd it would have a bizarre impact on the law in areas
relating to race and religion … originalism tends to suggest that states can
actually establish their own religions … [a]nd there’s pretty much no
122

Lawrence, supra note 3, at 7 (Breyer, J., majority opinion).

123

Of course, the debate concerning the implications of originalist philosophy, including the results that it
would create, is the subject of extensive commentary which is beyond the scope of this Article. In addition,
because originalist philosophy exists in numerous forms, and is advocated to varying degrees, there can be
no certain conclusions regarding the results that its application in particular forms would create. However,
the criticism that the originalist perspective would create unjust results is not without merit if, as Justice
Scalia advocates, courts looked exclusively to domestic practice when analyzing whether protection of a
particular right is warranted. A contrary result in Lawrence, for example, would have engendered precisely
this criticism.

33

originalist support for the general idea that the Constitution protects women
from discrimination by Congress or by state legislatures … Sunstein asks:
Does anybody really want to put on this ridiculous straightjacket?124
Consequently, “[w]hen confronted with the parade of horribles that originalism might
spawn … [i]t leaves us looking for another constitutional approach.”125
But what approach to constitutional interpretation can most effectively bridge
the divide between the Justice Breyer’s “progressivism (results consistent with
modern notions of liberty), and Justice Scalia’s “originalism” (fidelity to domestic
historical tradition and democratic process)? This Article proposes a modest solution
to this problem by introducing the concept of “reverse” originalism.
PART IV
INTRODUCING “REVERSE” ORIGINALISM – A PROGRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE THAT
REMAINS FAITHFUL TO THE UNITED STATES’ CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL
TRADITIONS
The significant divide between Justice Breyer’s “progressivism” and Justice
Scalia’s “originalism” suggests that reliance upon evolving notions of fairness and
liberty, based upon domestic and foreign perspectives, cannot be reconciled with a
court’s duty to remain firmly committed to domestic history and tradition. In fact, Justice
Breyer’s reliance upon the European Court of Human Rights conflicts directly with
Justice Scalia’s belief that the only rights worthy of protection are those that are “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s”126 historical tradition.
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The more fundamental question, however, concerns the purposes underlying
Justice’s Breyer’s reliance upon foreign sources f law, and stated position that “history
and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive
due process inquiry.”127 It would not be unfair, or unduly speculative, to assume that the
Lawrence opinion reflected a Supreme Court trying to achieve the “best policy,” or result
that is most consistent with evolving perspectives of equality, liberty and fairness. Apart
from the fact that such approach is likely to invite claims of “elitism”, judicial
policymaking and arbitrariness, the fact remains that the Lawrence majority was, at its
core, trying to achieve a just and equitable result for a group that has traditionally been
underrepresented (and unprotected) in our society. Whether that result was achieved is a
matter for debate; what is fairly uncontroversial is that “progressivism”, in its most basic
application, arguably seeks to do that which is “right” in a particular case, and the use of
foreign material is an important component of that search.128
This approach could not be more in conflict with Justice Scalia’s “originalist”
philosophy. Indeed, constitutional rights do not “spring into existence”129 simply because
an evolving consensus supports their recognition. On the contrary, policy change falls
squarely within the purview of democratic processes, as reflected through majority rule
and subsequent legislative promulgation. For Justice Scalia, therefore, the Lawrence
majority represented a circumvention of our constitutional structure “through the
invention of a brand-new ‘constitutional right’ by a Court that is impatient of democratic
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change.”130 In Justice Scalia’s view, therefore, American constitutionalism does not rely
upon the perspectives of a “wider civilization,”131 but instead finds expression through
the values and policy predilections that historical domestic tradition reveals.132
To begin with, there can be no doubt that both Justice Breyer’s “progressivism”
and Justice Scalia’s “originalism” have critically important components that are highly
relevant to, and a valuable aspect of, American constitutionalism. As a normative matter,
judges should, at least to some extent, strive to achieve the “right” result, that is, results
that are consonant with principles of fairness and equality, particularly where evolving
notions have demonstrated an existing practice to be oppressive or unjust. The idea that
courts will endeavor to prohibit State action that is inimical to basic due process
guarantees is neither novel nor suspect in our domestic practice. In fact, the Supreme
Court’s rich doctrinal history is replete with precedent where the Court has invalidated
long-standing practices that time has shown to be inconsistent with equal treatment.133 Of
course, while the line between proper judicial function and undesirable judicial activism
is often unclear, it cannot be said that a court’s scrupulous efforts to achieve the “right”
outcome is per se objectionable. Stated simply, “progressivism” and, arguably, its desire
to achieve equitable outcomes, should have a role in American constitutionalism.
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On the other hand, a court that strives to achieve “just” outcomes through
substitution of its policy predilections cannot be said to be acting within permissible
boundaries. Thus, to the extent that the “right” outcome is effectuated at the expense of
deference to a legislature’s constitutional authority, it should be exposed as intolerable
judicial activism. In other words, if there was ever a practice that is “deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition”134, is the venerable respect for the legislature’s
policymaking prerogative, both as an institution and expression of democratic processes.
Additionally, there is in referring to, and relying upon, our historical tradition when
determining whether an asserted “right” warrants constitutional protection. Indeed,
domestic tradition can provide important insights regarding the intent, scope and
purposes which underlie our most fundamental rights.
Moreover, knowledge of that history can inform a court’s perspectives regarding
the degree to which, as a general matter, the newly-asserted right has a cognizable basis
in the constitutional text. Furthermore, reliance upon domestic tradition ensures that our
social, political and cultural practices, as expressed through democratic processes and
majority will, occupy a venerable place in constitutional decision-making. Thus, when
confronted with “values” based adjudication, courts should be cognizant not only of their
institutional limitations, but also of the long-standing history that informs our very notion
of what it means to declare a newly-asserted right “fundamental”. Put differently, the
“originalist” position is an important aspect of American constitutional law.
The critical problem, for which this Article proposes a modest solution, is the
failure to realize that both the “progressive” and “originalist” philosophies can be
integrated into a unified method of constitutional interpretation. This Article posits that
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“negative” or “reverse” originalism represents a plausible method by which to remain
faith to historical tradition, while simultaneously achieving outcomes that are consistent
with evolving notions of liberty. The concept of “negative” originalism is based upon the
assumption that domestic tradition should be a core aspect of constitutional adjudication,
because such tradition reflects the unique cultural, political and social character of
national constitutionalism. However, “negative” originalism presupposes that the concept
of “rights,” particularly those worthy of constitutional protection, should not remain
stagnant or fixed in history. Rather, rights-recognition should be responsive to the
evolving perspectives of liberty that human experience generates.
Based upon these assumptions, the theory of “negative” originalism would require
a court not to divine the precise meaning of broadly worded constitutional phrases, or
divine the import of long-standing historical practice. Such an endeavor will likely entail
distinct interpretive difficulties, be subject to contrary conclusions, and risk arbitrary
and/or self-serving utilization. In some cases, moreover, the historical record will be
invariably unclear and susceptible to varying interpretations, thus proving inadequate for
constitutional decision-making processes. Furthermore, to the extent that domestic
practice can answer modern questions of rights-protection, the result may be highly
unjust or inequitable.
Thus, “negative originalism” would require a court to ascertain whether
protection of a newly-asserted right would be contrary to, inconsistent with or
discountenanced by the salutary values that our domestic tradition embraces. In other
words, “negative” originalism would require a court to discern the general or overriding
principles that underlie a particular constitutional provision, i.e., the Due Process Clause,
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or particular historical practice, i.e., race-related legislation, and examine whether the
newly-asserted right would contravene the general intent that has manifested itself
through evolution of domestic law. In this way, “negative” originalism would still require
a court, particularly in “values” based cases, to conduct a searching examination of the
historical record, as expressed through constitutional and legislative history, to ensure
that newly-recognized “rights” are supported by domestic tradition and not the result of
judicial policy predilection. In other words, the broad values that our country has deemed
sacrosanct, through democratic process and majoritarian rule, warrant special recognition
as expressions of our most deeply-held notions of liberty. Moreover, an integral aspect of
that recognition must be rooted in judicial decision-making that strives to continue the
evolution in “rights recognition” that this country has unquestionably undergone, yet in a
manner that is consistent with the broad values underlying that evolution rather than
subjective policy preferences. The failure to appreciate this fact is a recipe for judicial
usurpation of the democratic process.
Critically, however, the requirement that courts ascertain only the broad values or
general intent upon which domestic tradition is based reflects the principle that
conceptions of liberty, fairness and equality evolve over the course of time and through
the trials of human experience. Indeed, whether it be the experience of the United States
or foreign nations, conceptions of “rights protection” are undoubtedly informed by
human events, cultural evolution, and social awareness. For example, evolving notions of
discriminatory treatment have resulted in increasing protection for traditionally
disadvantages groups, i.e., women, minorities and homosexuals, through legislative
action and policy reform. Furthermore, evolutions in the very principles that formed our
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national constitutionalism have resulted in a society that most would agree is more fair,
equal, and free. Indeed, the judiciary has played a vital role in eradicating, through
landmark decisional law, various oppressive practices that evolving conceptions would
likely not tolerate. Stated simply, “negative” originalism recognizes that “values” based
adjudication must allow for the benefits that modern notions of liberty and fairness will
provide.
In addition, “negative” originalism reflects the fact that, in modern jurisprudence,
difficult issues invariably arise that could neither be contemplated by the drafters of our
Constitution nor resolved by reference to historical tradition. It is simply impossible to
expect that the Constitution’s drafters, or early legislative efforts, could have anticipated
the many difficult issues that would arise in the context of rights-protection. The broad
text of the Constitution’s many provisions, i.e., the Equal Protection Clause, arguably
serve, at least in part, as a testament to this notion. However, while various contemporary
“values” disputes could not have been anticipated or foreseen, the Constitution does set
forth broad provisions concerning liberty that can inform resolution of these disputes. It is
precisely for this reason that the broad guarantees upon which, for example, the Due
Process Clause is based, are relevant to answering the questions posed in “values” based
adjudication. As such, “negative” originalism contemplates an active role for courts in
discerning whether recognition of a newly-asserted right would contravene the salutary
principles that influenced the evolution of domestic tradition and practice. Importantly,
while “negative” originalism only requires courts to discern the general intent underlying
a given constitutional provision or historical tradition, such inquiry should be neither
confining nor superficial. For example, courts should focus upon the relevant
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circumstances, context and expectations which lead to the historical evolution of “liberty”
interests, to determine whether expansion of this interest warrants recognition of a newlyasserted right.
Of course, this proposition begs the question of whether and, if so, to what extent
foreign sources of law should factor into the court’s analysis. As a preliminary matter,
“negative” originalism would allow the use of foreign sources of law, but only to the
extent that such sources are neither inconsistent with nor contrary to the domestic
evolution of a particular constitutional value. In other words, foreign sources of law
should not be used to justify a court’s subjective policy judgment, or unilateral desire to
“draw American constitutional norms into ‘even closer union’ … with those of the rest of
the world.”135 Foreign sources of law should not, therefore, be used to globalize the court
at the expense of our unique domestic tradition; it should be used to confirm that an
expansion of our domestic practice, to recognize a newly asserted right, is supported by a
national evolution which renders incorporation with international consensus justified.
Otherwise, the use of foreign materials will be susceptible to claims of arbitrariness,
elitism and the desire by courts to substitute their policy predilections for those expressed
through the democratic process. The use of foreign materials in such a manner could not
be more pernicious, because it would undermine the values of our national
constitutionalism, and slowly remove constitutional decision-making from the historical
tradition upon which it rests.
Of course, these sentiments only serve as a brief introduction to “negative”
originalism, as its application will certainly engender practical difficulties. For example,
it can be argued that ascertaining merely the general intent underlying historical
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conceptions of liberty will allow courts to utilize undefined platitudes, that are nowhere
justified in domestic tradition, to unilaterally recognize new constitutional rights. The
concept of “liberty”, for example, can mean whatever a court says it does, and can result
in precisely the type of judicial policymaking that lies within the province of legislative
action. In addition, with a modest amount of creative interpretation, courts will be able to
selectively cite to domestic and foreign sources and justify whatever “rights expansion” it
deems desirable. Similarly, while it may be possible to discern the general intent
underlying specific constitutional provisions, such intent can never justify progressive
jurisprudence that was never within the contemplations of the constitution’s drafters.
These concerns are valid and merit significant debate. The problem, however, is
that the same arguments can be advanced against Justice Scalia’s originalism, Justice
Breyer’s progressivism, or any interpretive paradigm that vests judges with substantial
discretion. “Negative” originalism constitutes an attempt to channel that discretion in
such a manner that gives domestic practice primacy in constitutional decision-making,
yet allows courts to recognize that history has limits concerning the objectives to which it
strives and the situations to which it can be applied. The presence of a modern consensus
that results from collective human experience does not mean that a progressive
jurisprudence undermines domestic tradition. Moreover, by requiring courts to ensure
that expansive rights-protection, based upon contemporary perspectives, does not
undermine or offend our domestic tradition, “negative” originalism strives to ensure that
courts exercise extreme care in recognizing newly asserted rights. Court must be sensitive
to the historical record, and responsive to evolving notions of justice, if for no other
reason than to provide meaningful contemporary understandings of the Constitution’s
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most basic guarantees. Ultimately, courts should be circumspect to recognize “new”
rights, and even more careful to place undue reliance upon foreign sources of law. If
there exists uncertainty or conflict in domestic practice, then progressive change is best
left to the democratic process. However, the “emerging awareness”136 reflected in
“values” based adjudication warrants application of the principle that “history and
tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry.”137
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